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Porter’s Diamond Factor Model (DFM) is a theoretical framework that achieved prominence 
in Australian economic policy development since its inception in 1990.  Despite its 
widespread adoption, however, Australia has remained significantly below the OECD average 
in terms of its industrial clusters’ contributions to innovation and real wealth creation. In 
order to conceptualise the specific role that Porter’s DFM might play in the Australian policy 
development context, this paper analyses the 25-year history of the interaction between the 
Tasmanian state government and the Tasmanian Light Shipbuilding Industry cluster.  This 
analysis provides an insight into the set of government roles that facilitated the development 
of one of Australia’s most internationally competitive industry clusters, and proposes a re-
conceptualisation of Porter’s DFM that will potentially increase its value as a predictive tool 
for regional economic development.  
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Reconceptualising Porter’s Diamond for the Australian Context. 
 
Introduction. 
Since the 1970s, the onrush of globalisation in Australia’s markets has presented significant 
economic policy challenges to the country’s federal and state governments (Everett, 2002; 
Goldfinch, 1999; Moustafine, 1999).  A major concern for Australian legislators was (and 
remains) the question of making a nation previously protected by a ‘fortress’ of tariffs and 
subsidies more productive and competitive in world markets (Brown, 2000; Edwards, 2002; 
Martin, 2000; Quiggin, 1999).  One theoretical framework that achieved prominence in 
Australian economic policy development was Porter’s Industrial Cluster Theory (ICT) (see 
Australian Manufacturing Council, 1994; Bureau of Industry Economics, 1991; Keating, 
1994; Kelty, 1993; McKinsey and Company, 1994).  Porter’s ICT proposes that for a region 
to increase its innovative capacity and export earnings, its government (and relevant industry 
players) must interact to develop a sustainable array of internationally competitive industry 
clusters (Porter, 1990; 1998). Porter’s ICT argues that a nation’s industry clusters will likely 
be internationally competitive if a synergistic interrelationship exists between four Diamond 
Factor variables (i.e. ‘Factor Conditions’, ‘Local Demand Conditions’, ‘Related and 
Supporting Industries’, and ‘Firm Strategy, Structure and Rivalry’) and the two influencing 
roles of ‘Chance Events’ and ‘Government’ (see Porter (1990) for a discussion of the 








Figure 1: Porter’s (1990) Diamond Factor Model. 
 
 
Since the adoption of Porter’s Diamond Factor Model (DFM) as a basis for policy 
development, however, there has been considerable debate concerning its effectiveness, and 
indeed its appropriateness as a policy framework for Australia (see for example, Boddy, 2000; 
Gordon and McCann, 2000; Lyons, 1995; Wejland, 1999; Yla-Anttila, 1994).  The observed 
industry cluster failures (and under-performance) have been attributed to three main issues.   
The first is that Australian government policy development has largely been focused on 
descriptive information gathering rather than on achieving either business participation in, or 
greater understanding of the complex industrial clustering process (Davies, 2001).  The 
second surrounds an assumption by Australian policy-makers that the facts explaining the 
existence of industry clusters around the globe are readily generalisable to the Australian 
context (Boddy, 2000).  Of particular concern has been the assumption of Australian policy 
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makers that simply replicating the policy choices of governments associated with successful 
clusters (such as Silicon Valley) will be successful despite the lack of evidence to support this 
contention. The third issue concerns the ability of Australian governments’ to effectively and 
efficiently allocate resources to potential clusters.  Feser and Bergman (2000) note that, at 
least at the regional level, the approach frequently adopted by Australian policymakers 
involves little more than the identification of regional specialisations as targets for 
development initiatives.  In such cases, cluster strategy has merely served as a means to 
allocate scarce resources to existing economic  “winners”, rather than as an investment in 
building the linkages and future inter-industry synergies documented so frequently in 
internationally competitive industrial clusters (Feser and Bergman, 2000).   
 
Fundamental to all three issues is the observed difficulty of Australian policy-makers to 
conceptualise their role within Porter’s DFM (Brown 2000; Enright and Roberts, 2001).  
Whilst Porter’s DFM remains a powerful at explaining ‘how and why’ industry clusters have 
come to exist, it provides little prescriptive power in terms of a policy framework for 
government. Indeed, Brown (2000) suggests Australia’s poor performance at developing 
internationally competitive industry clusters is almost entirely predicated on the ‘confused 
role of government and its policy makers within the DFM’, a statement echoed by Porter 
when he stated that: 
…in Australia, what is less understood is that the government has some positive roles, like 
innovation and training, infrastructure, and things like that.  I think that the real frontier is 
[understanding] the positive roles to be played by government whilst avoiding the distortion or 
intervention in competition (in Trinca, 2002:39). 
 
In order to understand the positive roles that a government can play in the support of 
entrepreneurial activity and the development of innovative industrial clusters, this paper 
reports upon an examination of the 25-year history of one of Australia’s most innovative and 
internationally successful industry clusters: the Tasmanian Light Shipbuilding Industry 
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(TLSI) cluster.  The origins of the TLSI cluster can be traced to the tragic events surrounding 
the Tasman Bridge Disaster in 1975, when the government owned Lake Illawarra crashed 
into the 12th Pier of the bridge, causing it to collapse and sever the link between the Eastern 
Shore and Hobart City.  The subsequent need for ferry transport and production led a local 
entrepreneur (Mr. Robert Clifford, the managing director of Incat) to the realisation that an 
untapped international market for innovative fast ferries existed, and this realisation 
represented the mechanism by which the world’s first aluminium welding technology was 
developed.  Since its inception, the TLSI cluster has grown substantially in terms of its sales 
volume, innovative output, and impact on the industry’s overall development as a world-class 
maritime producer (Industry Audit, 1998).  At its peak between 1996 and 1998, the TLSI 
cluster generated an annual turnover of AUD$400 million (accounting for 25 percent of the 
state’s merchandise exports), and was fundamental in the development of an industry council 
that represented and coordinated the majority of the state’s maritime industry (Wickham and 
Hanson, 2002).  Given its demonstrable importance to the regional Tasmanian economy, an 
examination of the TLSI cluster’s development provides an opportunity to reconceptualise the 
DFM for the Australian context, and more specifically, the role that a regional government 
played in the development of an innovative and internationally competitive industry cluster.   
 
Method. 
This research comprised a series of semi-structured interviews with all of the key informants 
within the TLSI cluster and the state government during the period 1977 to 2002.  In 
particular, interviews were conducted with each of the state Premiers that held office between 
1977 and 2002, the managing directors of the TLSI cluster firms, and the heads of 
government departments and agencies with which the TLSI cluster had significant 
interactions. In total 25 semi-structured interviews were conducted, each lasting between 60 
and 90 minutes.  The interview questions posed to the participants were derived from an 
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extensive collection and analysis of historical data pertaining to the TLSI cluster’s 
development.  As such, the interviews contained both standardised interview questions (i.e. 
common to all informants) and specific interview questions (i.e. aimed at the key informants’ 
specific involvement in the TLSI cluster’s history), and were formulated to elicit the primary 
data required.    
 
The interpretation of the data, and the verification of the conclusions, were facilitated by the 
use of the QSR NUD*IST software package.  The interview transcripts were imported into 
the NUD*IST software database, following which the categories (i.e. the coding of the data) 
were established as a series of nodes.  These nodes were initially generated from the themes 
highlighted in literature review process, formed part of an index system that allowed the 
researcher to categorise respondent data in terms of extant theory.  Each node was then 
reviewed in order to identify common themes necessary for the researcher’s second-round 
coding that underpins the discussion and conclusions in this paper.    
 
Discussion. 
A growing literature base suggests that ‘who innovates’ and ‘how much’ innovative activity is 
undertaken by an industry cluster is closely linked to the phase of the industry life cycle, and 
is of vital importance to effective policy implementation (Klepper, 1996; Leigh, 2003).  It is 
therefore necessary for this research to report on the longitudinal variation in government 
policy development, and discuss their impact on the Diamond Factors over the TLSI cluster’s 
life cycle. 
 
The role of government during introductory stage of the TLSI cluster’s life cycle. 
 
During the introductory stage of its life cycle, three key government roles positively 
influenced the TLSI cluster’s development.  The first was the state government’s initial non-
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committal stance towards the development of the state’s burgeoning shipbuilding industry.  
At the time, the government’s policy focus was primarily on the macro-economic 
restructuring of the state’s economy away from its dependence on hydro-industrialisation, and 
not the growth requirements of the potential industry cluster.  Underpinning the government’s 
inaction was the maritime industry’s poor recent history at generating export earnings and 
employment opportunities within the state.  Since the 1940s, the reduced global demand for 
traditional shipping coupled with the inefficiencies inherent to ‘Fortress Australia’s’ shipping 
subsidies, meant that the international competitiveness and innovative capacity of Tasmania’s 
maritime industry stood at virtually zero for three decades.  Consequently, the development of 
Incat’s innovative technologies between 1977 and 1984 became the sole responsibility of the 
private sector firms that existed during the industrial cluster’s initial formation (i.e. Clifford 
and his array of maritime friends), with no additional input or direction from the state 
government.    
 
The second key role was the state government’s development of the region’s reputation 
within the broader domestic maritime market as a national centre for maritime research.  The 
Tasmanian government implemented a series of lobbying initiatives that resulted in the 
federal government providing additional funding to the Australian Maritime College and 
relocating its national maritime research institute (the CSIRO) to Hobart.  These state 
government lobbying efforts were largely aimed at the federal government rather than the 
private sector, but their success had implications for the region’s ‘Factor Conditions’, 
‘Related and Supporting Industry’, and ‘Local Demand Conditions’.   The regional 
economy’s factor conditions were advanced by developing the region’s supply of human 
capital through both the generation of specialised employment and education within the 
broader industry.  The regional economy’s related and supporting industries were advanced 
by the increase in the sophistication of supply of inputs to the private sector firms (in terms of 
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products and world standard maritime research). The Tasmanian government’s enhancement 
of the region’s reputation helped to develop the demand conditions faced by the private sector 
shipbuilding firms, most significantly in the from of customers ready to import their products 
from interstate.    
 
It was only after the domestic exporting success of Incat’s innovative semi-aluminium 
catamarans in the early 1980s were realised that the Tasmanian government undertook its 
third key role, that of accommodating the growth requirements of the TLSI cluster’s most 
innovative firm - Incat.  Although the Tasmanian government did provide its first direct 
support for Incat’s innovative management in the introductory stage of the TLSI cluster’s life 
cycle, it did so only after the firm was able to demonstrate the potential in the domestic 
Australian market for fast-ferry transportation.  The Tasmanian government’s support for 
Incat’s innovative capacity was provided only when the firm could demonstrate that it did not 
possess the resources required for its continued expansion.  The Tasmanian government also 
required evidence that their support of Incat’s expansion would result in additional jobs being 
created within the firm. This initial government support is consistent with the 
recommendation of Porter’s ICT, as it allows for the challenges facing the burgeoning 
industry to be overcome whilst avoiding the inefficiencies associated with the government’s 
direct involvement in private sector enterprise. 
 
The role of government during the growth stage of the TLSI cluster’s life cycle. 
During the growth stage of its life cycle, a further three key government roles positively 
influenced the development of the TLSI cluster.  The first was the Tasmanian government’s 
continued effort to enhance the reputation of the regional economy, although the focus of 
these efforts changed from the domestic maritime market to one that encompassed the 
international market for Incat’s fast-ferries.  This change in focus was driven by the continued 
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success of Incat’s innovative product line in the domestic ferry transportation market.  
Through the use of government sponsored trade missions and the associated negotiation 
activities, the Tasmanian government used the success of Incat to illustrate the region’s 
maritime competency to international buyers of these products, in turn facilitating an increase 
in the international demand conditions for Incat’s production.  The Tasmanian government 
also applied pressure on the remainder of the TLSI cluster firms, and indeed the region’s 
maritime industry as a whole, to similarly increase the quality of their production in line with 
the growing international reputation of the region.  
 
The second role undertaken by the Tasmanian government was that of direct support during 
Incat’s sales negotiations with their potential international customers.  This was directed by 
the incumbent state Premier at the time, through his department of economic development, 
most notably in the form of funding for international customer visits to Incat’s factory, but 
also by having the Premier accompany potential customers during their visit to the region.  As 
a result of the state government’s policy initiative to become involved in Incat’s sales 
negotiation process, it provided a level of prestige, moral support and sales expertise that was 
otherwise beyond the ability of the innovative firm to provide.  Indirectly, this policy also 
served to highlight the supplier firms within the TLSI cluster, as their inputs into Incat’s final 
product were also supported by the state government’s involvement in the sale.    
 
The Tasmanian government’s third key role was to undertake measures that deliberately 
maximised the synergistic relationship that existed between the TLSI cluster firms.  Inherent 
to Porter’s ICT is the notion that within a clustered network of firms, some forms of scale and 
scope economies exist through which an industrial cluster develops its international 
competitive advantage.  Through its development of marine parks and industrial councils (in 
which firms complementary to Incat’s innovative operations can more easily interact) the 
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Tasmanian government deliberately enabled the realisation of the synergies of both scale and 
scope inherent to the region’s ‘natural maritime industry’.   The third state government role 
served to advance the diamond factors by developing the ‘Firm Strategy, Structure and 
Rivalry’ and the ‘Factor Conditions’ enjoyed by the TLSI cluster firms in residence at the 
TLSI cluster marine park in Hobart.  With the TLSI cluster firms in close geographic 
proximity, the individual firms were better able to communicate and coordinate their 
production and training activities, as well as allowing them to access the advanced and 
specialised (and expensive) infrastructure developed for the marine park by the Tasmanian 
government.   
 
The role of government during the maturity stage of the TLSI cluster’s life cycle. 
During the maturity stage of its life cycle, a further three key government roles positively 
influenced the development of the TLSI cluster.  The first key role was the continued 
enhancement of the regional economy’s reputation as a world centre for maritime 
manufacturing excellence, although the focus of its efforts changed from the singular 
promotion of Incat’s success to incorporate the production of the entire set of industry 
members, be they TLSI cluster firms or otherwise.  The functional strategies incorporated by 
the Tasmanian government included trade missions, direct involvement in the international 
sales negotiations process, and the provision of marketing assistance to the industry.  The 
marketing assistance provided to the industry was specifically targeted at generating a 
consistent message for all of Tasmanian firms in the international marketplace.   
 
The policy to incorporate the entire set of cluster firms developed the demand conditions for 
the regional industry, with the region now marketed as a ‘one-stop-shop’ for a wide variety of 
innovative and high-quality maritime production, not simply fast catamaran production.  The 
state government could afford to undertake this marketing strategy given the success that the 
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TLSI cluster firms had enjoyed both individually, and as a network, during the growth phase.  
For example, by the end of the growth stage of the TLSI cluster’s development, each of the 
supplier firms had secured their own export sales independent of those associated with their 
alliance with Incat.  Further to this, two additional TLSI cluster firms, Liferaft Systems and 
Richardson Devine, emerged within the industry and enjoyed immediate export success, 
largely due to their association with Incat and the innovative and valuable nature of their 
output.   
 
The second key role was to formalise the relationship between the region’s entire set of 
shipbuilders and maritime manufacturers (TLSI cluster firms or otherwise) and the state 
government.  After the TLSI cluster maritime park was established, the private sector firms, 
along with the Aluminium Welding School, formed the Tasmanian Maritime Network (TMN) 
within which the TLSI cluster could better develop its communications and lobbying efforts.  
After the Bacon Labor government’s industry audit program of 1998 was completed, the 
TMN was restructured to form an ‘Industry Council’ that represented approximately 85 
percent of the region’s shipbuilding and marine manufacturing firms.  The Industry Council 
program sought to provide the region’s shipbuilding industry with a direct communication 
and lobbying channel between the industry as a whole and the Tasmanian government.  The 
Industry Council arrangement also helped to ensure that that the set of firms within the 
industry could better incorporate the success factors of the TLSI cluster into their operations, 
and therefore become involved in the process of further developing the regional industry’s 
‘Firm Strategy Structure and Rivalry’ to comply with world-best standards.   
 
The third key role was the Tasmanian government’s strategy to dilute Incat’s importance and 
impact within the regional economy.  The policy was implemented through the attraction of 
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additional innovative shipbuilding firms to the region (producing vessels unlike those of 
Incat) in the hope that the TLSI cluster’s supplier firms would have alternate sources of sales 
opportunities incremental to that of Incat.  The Tasmanian government was able to attract 
additional innovative firms through marketing the region’s advanced infrastructure, support 
that was initially provided solely for the benefit of Incat.  Where needed, the Tasmanian 
government also provided the option to undertake an equity arrangement with the new hub-
firms, an arrangement that involved funding of the new firms’ relocation and start-up costs, 
but did not involve the state government intervening in the innovative processes of the 
individual firms.  This policy initiative had a direct impact on the Diamond Factors enjoyed 
by the TLSI cluster (and indeed the entire industry) by effectively driving incremental 
demand from the international marketplace for the region’s maritime production.  In addition, 
it allowed the TLSI cluster’s supplier firms to develop exponentially greater linkages within 
the industry, and more importantly, with firms of similar importance as the original hub-firm 
in terms of their innovative ability and supply requirements.   
 
Implications 
The findings of this research indicate that the role of government in the Australian context is 
far more significant than the exogenous one theorised by Porter (1990).  Indeed, an analysis 
of the TLSI cluster’s development indicates that the role of an Australian government is an 
endogenous, and arguably central to the machinations of the DFM for an Australian economy.  
As such, for the purposes of providing a role for an Australian government in a regional 
economy, the variable cannot be considered exogenous to the Diamond Factors underpinning 
Porter’s ICT.  Rather, the role of government must be considered fully integrated within the 
Diamond Factors, indicating that it is directly involved in their development, and indeed very 
generation over time. 
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The findings of this research also indicate that theorising the role of chance events within a 
regional economic model also requires some attention.  Under Porter’s original DFM, chance 
events are similarly considered exogenous to the diamond factor’s interaction, and the role 
that the government has to play in the development of industrial clusters.  This research 
indicates that the role of the government may be directly influenced by those chance events 
that serve to amplify the commercial importance of regional economy’s Diamond Factors, as 
the Tasman Bridge Tragedy did with the shipbuilding skills inherent (yet dormant for 
decades) within the state.  As such, the adapted model for a regional Australian economy 
includes an integrative link between the original Diamond Factors, and the occurrence of 
‘Chance Events’ that serve to amplify their commercial value in the international market.  It 
similarly indicates that government policy makers should view chance events that do not 
coincide with the ‘natural advantages’ or the advanced social capital developed within the 
region with some caution.  The research also indicates that the adapted model must consider 
the region’s store of social capital as an important variable in the development of 
internationally competitive industrial clusters.  Unlike the economy’s factor conditions, which 
refer largely to physical assets, the region’s store of social capital refers to the latent or tacit 
knowledge possessed by an economy’s labour market, their cultural understanding (based 
upon the region’s historical dependencies) and their belief that efforts to leverage this 
knowledge and understanding in the marketplace will lead to commercial success.   
 
Given the above discussion, Figure 2 presents a plausible alternative DFM for industrial 
cluster development in a regional Australian economy.   In line with the research findings, the 
‘Role of Government’ is altered from an exogenous variable to one that is central, and 
necessarily intrusive in the regional economic development process.  As demonstrated in the 
discussion section, the key to an effective government role centres on the timing of its policy 
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initiatives and the changing life cycle needs of the industry cluster. Similarly, ‘Chance 
Events’ are incorporated into the adapted model, and although they are represented here as an 
important variable, their occurrence is not considered essential to the development of 
internationally competitive industrial clusters.  Instead, ‘Chance Events’ are characterised as 
occurrences that serve to initiate industrial clustering activities.  The region’s store of social 
capital is also incorporated into the adapted model.  Although it may lie dormant for some 
considerable length of time (as with Tasmania’s shipbuilding competencies), the variable 
represents the set of intangible economic assets possessed by a region’s labour market, which 
may also serve as a basis for the formation of the regional economy’s internationally 
competitive industrial clusters. 
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